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Andrew Watterson argues that failures in worker health and public 
health planning have collided with devastating effect. This blog draws 
upon a research report, available here. 
Occupational health and safety, a reserved matter, has been a Cinderella in 
the funding and staffing policies and practices of successive UK governments. 
Worse than that it has been a specific target in the last decade or more for 
those wishing to cut red tape. In the argot of the time this meant to deregulate 
or, in the softer versions, to ‘better regulate’ or ‘smarter regulate’. These 
policies have damaged inspections, monitoring, information and advice and 
enforcement on workplace risks arising from established hazards at a time 
when thousands of workers each year were already dying from occupational 
diseases and millions had their health damaged by work-caused or work-
related factors. 
Running parallel with these cuts and ideological attacks have come significant 
cuts in the National Health Service, most pronounced in England but biting 
across the whole of the UK in terms of staffing and resources. Juxtaposition 
these two elements with the possibility of a pandemic which could take out key 
workers in acute, primary and social care, and also from key parts of our 
economy, and a perfect storm looms. 
It seems unlikely that UK governments realised there could be circumstances 
where cuts in health and safety that damaged public health would ever be 
immediately and visibly  obvious to the public and with such tragic effects. 
Now they are. The failures to plan for a pandemic and effectively protect the 
occupational health and safety of doctors, nurses, paramedics and other 
emergency workers treating patients have had major repercussions for the 
treatment of pandemic patients and for the workers themselves. The failures 
have included not only  the lack of suitable and sufficient personal protective 
equipment and its rapid delivery but also staff shortages which put huge 
pressures on remaining staff in terms of fatigue and stress. This has been 
compounded by a significant number of doctors, nurses and allied health 
professionals either self-isolating or falling ill themselves. Hence the 
implications of the testing, tracing and lockdown policy failures are factors that 
damaged the NHS workforce directly and indirectly and so added to 
hazardous and risky NHS and social care working conditions. 
Two defences could be made for what has happened in the UK. Firstly it might 
be argued that no pandemic had been foreseen or foreseen on the scale that 
COVID-19 has affected the world. This is not an argument easily defended as 
the coronaviruses were first identified  in animals in the 1930s and then in 
humans in the 1960s. The particular coronavirus that emerged in 2019 could 
not have been foreseen but the effects of such viruses had been flagged 
repeatedly in 2005, 2009, 2015, 2019 and early 2020 by WHO  and other 
organisations. Specific issues about the availability of PPE and the possibility 
of such viruses causing a pandemic were also widely recognised 
internationally .  Numerous early warnings and indeed guides on what to do in 
the case of a pandemic were either ignored or only partially taken on board in 
the UK. There may well be evidence here of wilful ignorance in some 
Government and scientific civil servant responses.  
A second defence could be that all the planning necessary for a pandemic had 
been done in the UK. It has been argued no country could have done more to 
protect the health and safety of its health care professional related workforce 
so that they would be able to treat and care for pandemic patients. 
This defence is flawed because in 2005 the International Health Regulations 
bound every country to prioritize & dedicate domestic resources and  recurrent 
spending for pandemic  preparedness. This did not happen sufficiently 
between 2005 and 2020. UK flu preparation for example were found wanting 
in various respects in 2011, 2012, 2014, 2016. In 2017, the UK government 
apparently rejected advice to give PPE to all frontline NHS staff in a flu 
epidemic. In 2014, 2018, 2019 and early 2020 the WHO and ILO produced 
guides, manuals and even courses on planning and preparing for a pandemic 
all of which included making sure front-line health care staff had the 
PPE,  equipment and resources they needed.   
In 2020 the UK government manifestly had not prepared effectively for the 
pandemic and failed to act not just on early warnings including ones from 
China, South Korea and elsewhere but early global guides on how to 
safeguard health workers so they would then be able to safeguard the public 
and treat pandemic patients. The precautionary public health principle is 
geared to prevention and it is difficult to envisage a public health threat that 
could have warranted a more precautionary approach than a pandemic and 
one that required extensive testing, early lockdowns, and ample supplies of 
PPE. Yet the Government did not act. 
We are still in the pandemic. So there is little justification for not now taking 
even greater steps to protect our health, emergency social care and key 
employees in ways that will not hinder or disrupt their work. This is of course 
the irony not recognised by our Government because good health and safety 
practices will safeguard these health workers who safeguard the public who 
safeguard our economy. The three elements are closely intertwined.  The 
Health and Safety Executive responsible for UK workplace health and safety 
now states it wants to be flexible and proportionate in dealing with COVD-
19.  Yet the HSE appeared to go missing for weeks and months when the 
pandemic started. It is also difficult to envisage how a proportionate response 
to major failing in protecting doctors, nurses and social care workers often on 
our screens nightly could have been anything less than rapid interventions 
requiring immediate health and safety improvements. 
This should mean early regulatory interventions in workplaces through 
inspections, monitoring, advice and support. PPE provision and adequate 
staffing levels, testing, the position of vulnerable workers outside healthcare 
and so on should all be considered health and safety matters. There should 
also be requirements on health and safety grounds that ministers, regulators 
and others provide details and timetables on  PPE provision and testing and 
quantities; ensure proper consultation with workforces on pandemic 
planning;  update the public, trade unions and the media  regularly on how 
many health and other workers have been made ill or died from COVID 
caused or COVID related illnesses. 
Pandemics cannot be avoided but COVID-19 has shown that the UK could 
and should have done a lot better to protect its workforce, protect the public 
and hence protect the economy too. 
 
 
